The International Risk Podcast

Episode 311: Grey Zones at Europe’s Edge: Ceuta, Melilla and Maritime Power with Dr. Ángeles Jiménez

• Dominic Bowen • Season 6 • Episode 311

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In this episode, Dominic Bowen and Ángeles Jiménez discuss the geopolitical significance of Ceuta and Melilla as Europe’s only land borders with Africa, and why these two Spanish cities embody sovereignty disputes and migration pressure between Spain, Morocco, and the European Union. They unpack how these enclaves function as “grey zones” where coercion, leverage, and competition occur below the threshold of armed conflict.

Find out more about how migration has become a tool of geopolitical pressure, how EU border externalisation shapes incentives on both sides of the Mediterranean, and why securitisation has repeatedly failed to prevent humanitarian tragedies at these borders. The discussion highlights how local events in Ceuta and Melilla are embedded in wider regional dynamics involving EU–Morocco relations, Western Sahara, and strategic bargaining.

The conversation also addresses the often-overlooked maritime dimension of the dispute, including continental shelf claims, maritime boundary delimitation, and the role of international law under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. Ángeles Jiménez explains how technical legal processes can become politicised and why maritime claims matter for resources, influence, and long-term strategic positioning.

Finally, they explore the concept of grey zone strategy more broadly, examining how states pursue territorial and political objectives through legal acts, narrative framing, migration management, and civilian mobilisation, without triggering open conflict. The episode reflects on what Ceuta and Melilla reveal about modern geopolitics, international risk, and the limits of legal and institutional solutions.

Ángeles Jiménez García-Carriazo holds a Ph.D. in Law, specializing in the Law of the Sea and Public International Law. She is currently a Research Fellow at the University of Cádiz (Spain), where she leads various academic and policy-oriented initiatives on ocean governance and human rights at sea. She also serves as Legal Advisor to the Spanish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, and is a member of the Spanish Delegation to the United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS). She is the Director of the Observatory for Migration and Human Rights of the European University of the Seas Alliance (SEA-EU). Her scholarly output includes a monograph, edited volumes, numerous book chapters, and peer-reviewed articles addressing key areas of the law of the sea: the continental shelf, maritime boundary delimitation, underwater cultural heritage, peaceful settlement of disputes, and human rights at sea.

The International Risk Podcast brings you conversations with global experts, frontline practitioners, and senior decision-makers who are shaping how we understand and respond to international risk. From geopolitical volatility and organised crime, to cybersecurity threats and hybrid warfare, each episode explores the forces transforming our world and what smart leaders must do to navigate them. Whether you’re a board member, policymaker, or risk professional, The International Risk Podcast delivers actionable insights, sharp analysis, and real-world stories that matter.

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Dominic Bowen is the host of The International Risk Podcast and Europe’s leading expert on international risk and crisis management. As Head of Strategic Advisory and Partner at one of Europe’s leading risk management consulting firms, Dominic advises CEOs, boards, and senior executives across the continent on how to prepare for uncertainty and act with intent. He has spent decades working in war zones, advising multinational companies, and supporting Europe’s bu

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00:00: Angeles: We are playing this game blind, because we know what we are asking for but we don’t know what our neighbors are asking for. Because in order to comply with the deadlines, according to the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea. What they did is they already submitted preliminary information, and with that they complied with the deadline. But we haven’t seen the final submission of Morocco.

Elisa Garbil: Welcome back to the International Risk Podcast, where we discuss the latest world news and significant events that impact businesses and organisations worldwide. 

00:35: Dominic: And this episode is brought to you by Conducttr. Conducttr software helps you design and deliver crisis exercices, without needing a big team or weeks of preparation. You can create a central exercice library with Conducttr world and you can generate reports that support your governance and compliance requirements. So if you want flexible, realistic crisis exercises, that are easy to adopt, then Conducttr is worth a look. And I have a quick favor to ask, before we start today. If you’re a regular listener, please subscribe and follow the International Risk Podcast. It’s the simplest way to support the show, and it helps us reach more listeners who need this content. And my commitment to you is that we’ll keep improving every part of the experience. From our guests, the research and the practical insights we provide. And, if there’s a guest you think we should bring on the podcast, or a risk that you want unpacked, send it through to us,n and I promise we read all of your comments; Please hit the subscribe or follow button now, and let’s jump in to today’s episode.

01:34: Dominic Bowen: Today, we're looking at one of Europe's most overlooked flashpoints, Ceuta and Melilla. They’re two Spanish territories on the African continent that sit at the center of far larger games involving migration, maritime law, sovereignty disputes, and even grey zone coercion. These enclaves aren't just historical anomalies; they're actually test beds for how states utilize borders, people, and narratives to gain leverage without triggering open conflict. I'm Dominic Bowen, and I'm the host of the International West Podcast. And in today's episode, we're exploring the complex and often tense dynamics along the EU southern borders, where questions of sovereignty, migration, and maritime strategy intersect. Today, we're joined by Angeles Gimenez. She's a lecturer at the University of Cardiff, and she's an expert on the law of the sea, on boundary delimitations in the maritime environment, and even on the extension of the continental shelf. She has a rich background in international law, in European affairs, and she brings really deep insight into the legal frameworks that actually shape the geopolitical realities that we're living in. In our conversation today, we really hope to gain insight into these two Spanish territories and the dispute between Spain and Morocco, and what it reveals about grey zone strategies, migration, sovereignty, and contested regions around the world. Angeles, welcome to the International Risk Podcast.

 

02:56: Ángeles Jiménez: Hi, thank you very much. I'm really glad to be here.

02:59: Dominic Bowen: Well, I think this is going to be a really interesting conversation. You know, we speak a lot. We have a lot of guests on the podcast speaking about China and America and Ukraine and Russia and the Middle East. But this is the first time we've spoken about these two Spanish enclaves within Moroccan territory. So I think this will be a really great conversation today.

03:15: Ángeles Jiménez: Thank you so much for bringing this topic to your audience. I think it's a very, it's an unknown thing, the assistance of these two Spanish cities located on the African continent. They are very close. It's only 14 kilometers from Cadiz to Ceuta, but it seems to be a different world. So I think people would like to explore more about these two cities.

03:36: Dominic Bowen: I think they really would. And anyone who just does any YouTubing and searching for these cities will see what looks like absolutely beautiful territories. I'm a big fan of Morocco. I think it's a beautiful country to visit and no doubt live in as well. But I think these territories just look absolutely gorgeous. But we're not talking about the holiday destinations. We're talking about these two territories that sit at the centre of the African continent and and really this far larger conversation, as we said, that involves migration and maritime law and and sovereignty and and geopolitical disputes and and coercion.  And they're not just, as I said in the introduction, they're not just these historical anomalies. I think they really are testbeds. And now Spain claims these as unquestionable sovereign territory, whereas Morocco sees them as historical mistakes. And I think the European Union treats these as externalized borders. Now, given the 500 years or more than 500 years of continuous Spanish presence, how should we treat territories like this using the law of today?

04:32: Ángeles Jiménez: So thank you for this question, because I think we need to talk about these territories where history, law, migration, resources, and geopolitics intersect. And we are talking here about neighbourly relations between Spain and Morocco. But if we see the wider picture, the bigger picture, we are in the area of the Strait of Gibraltar. There are more actors involved. It's not only Spain and Morocco. We have the EU. We will have the UN around because of Western Sahara and the peacekeeping operations. We have the United Kingdom because due to Gibraltar and even the United States because there is a naval base in Rota. So in this small area that is the entry to the Mediterranean, we have all these actors involved. That's why we put so much importance on these two cities. There are not only two cities, but there are also some rocks that are also under Spanish sovereignty, Alucemas, Chafarinas, and Vélez de la Gomera. But of course, we give relevance to the cities because this is where the people are living. As you mentioned, they have historically been Spanish. Ceuta was conquered by Portugal in the 15th century. And then, when the Kingdom of Spain and Portugal separated in 1640, Ceuta was the only city that proclaimed itself Spanish. So in since 6040, Ceuta has been Spanish. Melilla was conquered in the 15th century by Pedro de Estupiña. And again, it was gradually consolidated through agreement, sovereignty, and military presence. So today we have two Spanish territories on the African continent, long before the creation of the modern Moroccan state. So they have been there before Morocco was a state. The Spanish presence and sovereignty was they were repeatedly confirmed by the pre-sovereign Moroccan entity by the beauty of treaties signed with sultans dating back to the 18th century. So what we have today are the only two EU cities. So at the end of the day, what we have here are EU external borders, land borders in Africa, and the main characteristic is that they are located on the southern coast of the Mediterranean.

06:45: Dominic Bowen: And that's really interesting. And I think the history is absolutely fabulous. Is there a difference between the legal boundaries and the international law perspective, and what actual political leaders see, and the political realities of the locations of these cities? Is there a difference between the two?

07:01: Ángeles Jiménez: Not really, it's true that the sovereign title of Ceuta was transferred from Portugal to Spain. So Portugal was, they conquered, and then the title was transferred. Whereas Melilla was conquered by Spain from the beginning in the 15th century. But there is not really a difference now that the title of sovereignty is supposed to be valid by the time they were acquired.

 

07:25: Dominic Bowen: And tell us a little bit about these enclaves. You know, if one was to visit these cities, would they be meeting with Moroccans? Would they be meeting with the Spanish? What would they see? What would they fight for? What would they feel? And what's the cuisine? What are the buildings like? Tell us a little bit about these cities.

 

07:39: Ángeles Jiménez: So I've been to both cities. I live in Cadiz, so I'm just 14 kilometers away from Ceuta. You can take a ferry. In one hour, you will be there. So you cross the Strait, and you get to Ceuta, which looks like a Spanish city in the buildings, the architecture. You can feel the military presence from the past because of the fortification of the city. So it looks like this kind of enclave that you needed to protect. It would be something similar for Melilla. We'll talk about Melilla later. And then Ceuta is surrounded by forest. So that's why you cannot see the fences all the time because there is a lot of forest. We will talk about that later, I guess. But cuisine, there is some mix, of course. You have the rich Moroccan gastronomy cuisine, you have the Spanish influence, and I think that the intersection of both cuisines. And then you can only go from Spain to Ceuta. I mean, there is no ferry going from Morocco to Thelta. In that case, you need to use the land border. So even for Detroit, and everything is coming from the Iberian Peninsula, it is not coming from Morocco. So that is interesting. And there is no airport in Theota because, as I said, there is a forest, so there is no place for an airport. So you can also take the helicopter, but the usual way is to take a ferry. For Melilla, the situation is quite different. It is farther, much farther. So it is still in the Western Mediterranean, but it is wider, the gap in the sea, in that area. It is opposite Granada's coast. So again, you can take a ferry from Motril, from Malaga, from Almeria. It takes much longer. It takes a minimum of four hours. There is also one where you spend the night on board. And then you disembark in Melilla, and there is an airport. So you can also take a plane from Madrid to Barcelona. So it is better. it is At least it is connected also by air on a regular basis. And then the city itself it is surprising. It is the second city after Barcelona with more modernism. So there are a lot of buildings that were inspired by... Gaudí. So it is shocking that you get into Africa and you see something that reminds you of Barcelona.

 

09:46: Dominic Bowen: Very interesting. And I think it's great to really hear about some of these really positive and exciting things. We talk a lot on the International Risk Podcast about all the things that could go wrong and all the things that we might be concerned about. But there are a lot of positive things and a lot of really exciting and even delicious things that we can be exploring as well. And when we look at the European Union and its relationship with African states and states across the continent, Europe is increasingly outsourcing migration, and it's outsourcing migration control, and it's doing so to neighbouring countries. Now, this often creates strategic dependencies, dependencies that our politicians, policy advisors, and even business leaders often don't account for. So I'd love to hear from you based on your research. What are the risks that Europe has when it comes to its own stability and migration policy when we look at migration from North Africa? And are there certain pressure points that we need to keep in mind when we're looking at migration from North Africa? And do these enclaves play a significant part when it comes to European border security and strategy?

 

10:47: Ángeles Jiménez: So, as I mentioned, we are in the street area, and we have the two main actors, Spain-Morocco, of course, because of Spain, but our neighborly relations have been described as strange neighbors, the distant relations, cautious neighborhoods. So there is a kind of mutual distrust. And one of the main reasons is migration. Of course, there is migration as an objective data point that these cities have been under constant migratory pressure since the 90s, I would say, and in need of permanent structural measures, but then we also have the other side that migration has been used as a political weapon, and I think we have evidence of that. I think we can mention some of them, the unfortunate incident or event that happened a few years ago. But this has been a way to achieve objectives in the relation between the two countries at the end of the day, with the EU2 and altering at least Spanish foreign policy. So with this, I'm referring to the crisis in May 2021 in Ceuta. There was a migration movement, and migrants entered Ceuta either by swimming or using flotation devices. And rumors began to spread in Morocco the night before that the local authorities were taking a lax attitude toward their control. And there were 10,000 people coming in three days and crossing the borders the especially coming, as I said, swimming, including over 1,000 miners that stayed in the city. The miners, I have read news that they were tricked with the promise of seeing Messi or Cristiano Ronaldo, that supposedly they were in the city, so they are risking their lives to come and see the football players. But the apparent motive was Spain's decision to admit Brahim Ghali, the leader of the Polisario Front, into the country for medical treatment. He was suffering from COVID-19. Spain decided to admit him for this medical treatment. And then migration was used as a kind of weapon, this migration pressure to influence the Spanish position. And we have seen the consequences in the way Spain has changed its position regarding Western Sahara.

 

13:01: Dominic Bowen: And I'll take this opportunity just to remind our listeners that if you like to watch your podcasts, the International Risk Podcast is always available on YouTube. So please go to YouTube and search for the International Risk Podcast and remember to subscribe and like our content. This is really critical for our success. Angeles, I would like to understand a little bit more detail about Morocco's strategic role and how Morocco and the European Union manage and engage in the sort of dialogue they have when it comes to the border. You spoke about the numbers just then, you know, 1,000 miners and 10,000 people in three days. And I remember those stories in some of the pictures, and they were really quite distressing and and and upsetting seeing, you know, so many of these people try to to get in. But how is this, is this a positive relationship between the EU and Morocco, or is it something that's strained and and what implications does this have for Spain's international relations with Morocco?

 

13:52: Ángeles Jiménez: So, let's say the relationship is again, as the one with Spain, it is distant. There is a kind of mistrust, but we are also trying to connect with our neighbors. So Morocco has increasingly used migration as a weapon, as a political lever, as we mentioned. But it's not only about migration, but it's also economic pressure, and it is also the diplomatic escalation. So the incident in Ceuta demonstrated the vulnerability of Ceuta and Melilla. And at the end of the day, these are the EU external borders. So it is also in the relations with the EU that we can see this vulnerability. but also, for example, the economic pressure, the closure of the commercial land border with Melilla in 2018. So when you read the news now, it seems that this happened later and that it was associated with COVID-19. No, this is not related to the pandemic. It was something that happened before in 2018. When the commercial land border was closed. And then it was in 2020 when the border crossing was closed. So what is behind this? What is the logic behind this? So it might be an attempt to redirect the trade towards Morocco's port. They are trying to enhance the promotion of Nador West Med. Nador is next to Melilla, so of course, if the border closed if the is commercial border is closed, then they need to redirect the traffic. Regarding diplomatic weaponization, there have been claims that Ceuta and Melilla are Moroccan cities under occupation. And there is recent news on that. In December 2020, in the wake of Donald Trump's recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over the Western Sahara, the Moroccan Prime Minister at that time, Otmani, sparked controversy by claiming that Ceuta and Melilla, like Western Sahara, are Moroccan, in an interview with the Saudi television channel, Arshark. And he said, literally, the issue of Ceuta-Melilla is a matter that must be addressed. It has been pending for five or six centuries, but one day it will be opened. First, we must definitively resolve the Western Sahara conflict. So we can see these kinds of claims exist. This statement in 2020 led to the urgent summoning of the Moroccan ambassador in Madrid and created a lot of political debate internally. So these claims, this diplomatic weaponization, the lobbying within EO institution to save narrative, we have all heard about the Qatar gate or the moroccan Morocco gate, to improve the image of these countries in the at the EU level. and And then, of course, always this bilateral pressure from Morocco to obtain support for Morocco's autonomous plan in Western Sahara, how it started with the US the last days of Donald Trump in his previous mandate, and how they have attracted more support. So let's say that this is a kind of diplomatic victory for at least over Spain with the change, with the shift in the political position of Spain regarding Western Sahara. And then, of course, the maritime unilateralism of Morocco. So we are talking here about borders, and Morocco is delineating its maritime zones. that say, and in 2020 they adopted new laws to replace the previous one, establishing Moroccan maritime zones unilaterally, and including, for example, the waters of Western Sahara, and so as claiming then as theirs, the waters around the Canary Islands. Of course, these laws are not registered with the UN. The Secretary General of the United Nations is the depository of all these instruments, so they haven't given them due publicity. They cannot oppose them to third parties. But this is an attempt to shape the future delimitation through facts on the ground.

 

17:41: Dominic Bowen: And the Ceuta and Melilla enclaves, they're surrounded by these multi-layered high fences at points up to 10 metres high. There are surveillance systems, there are heavily equipped Spanish and Moroccan forces, and that makes any crossing into these territories intrinsically dangerous. And I think when several hundred people or even thousands attempt to cross at once... And they're crowding at narrow gates, combined with you know, tear gas and security forces using batons, rubber bullets, anti-riot techniques. It's not surprising that we see crush injuries. We see suffocation. We see people falling from these high fences. And then, of course, there's delayed medical access. So, you know, we understand how these tragedies occur at a very personal level. But I'm wondering about the structural factors, you know, at the more macro level. What's contributing to these recurring migrant train tragedies along the border of these enclaves? Is there more that can be done at the policy level?

 

18:30: Ángeles Jiménez: So you were referring to another unfortunate event that happened in Melilla in twenty twenty two June where about migrants from sub-Saharan African countries attempted to escape the border fences between Morocco and Melilla. And so they stormed the fences, and in the course, many of them were crushed between the high border fences and Moroccan security forces who were using tear gas and bullets. So of course, when we are if we see the cities If we see the cities, they are surrounded by water, they are in they are coastal cities, and on the other side, they are all surrounded by fences. First, there is a Spanish fence, and then there is a Moroccan fence, and then there is space between them. Of course, the fences are monitored all day, all the time by the Guardia Civil here in Spain, they have the cameras all the way around to monitor what is happening, to monitor how the people are trying to attend. So if we distinguish these two, if we can distinguish the event in 2021 and the events in 2022, in 2021, there were over 10,000 people, most of them were Moroccans. Whereas in 2022, over ten thousand people, most of them were Moroccans, whereas in twenty twenty two Morocco was usually a transit country. People who are coming to Ceuta and Melilla, they are coming from other sub-Saharan states and they are, and it is a way to enter Europe. It is a, of course, most of the migrants, what they do is they take one of the routes in the Mediterranean, and they cross to the continent. But this is another way to enter Europe. So once you are inside the cities, you can ask for asylum, you can start the procedure before going on this dangerous journey through the sea. So, how is this monitored at the end of the day? We know that for the EU, this is a concern, of course, because there is a land border between Africa and the European Union. But even though we have two autonomous cities, the region under Spain is not an autonomous city. They are part of the EU with some characteristics because they are outside the EU customs union. They have a special VAT regime. But Schengen. Schengen comes here because they are part of Schengen, but the regulations established by Spain when Spain joined the EU and when we entered the Schengen area, there are specific border controls and a visa exemption for residents of the neighboring Moroccan provinces. So with these exemptions in the Schengen regime, it means that there is a visa exemption for the residents of Ceuta and Nador, which are the provinces surrounding Ceuta and Melilla. And the idea behind this was to cover the small-scale border traffic, the cross-border label, the retail trade, because at the end of the day, these cities are isolated. If they are purely Schengen with all the kind if you need a visa to enter the cities were suffering so this is the way to maintain this border traffic between the Melilla and the Moroccan provinces around the fact that there is this visa exemption means that they you need to go through identity and document checks when traveling from the Melilla to mainland Spain or other Schengen countries so you are still in the EU but you have to go through borders control you need to show your id or your passport because there are people who enter the city with without this visa so that's why people are still surprised that they need to solve their they need to travel with identity documents yeah it is because of that so this is a way to let's say control, and it is also because the moment you travel from Ceuta and Melilla to any other state, you are and you are already in the EU. So that is the logic behind the EU putting this importance on fences and on the control.

 

22:19: Dominic Bowen: Yeah, that makes a lot of sense. And one of the topics we discuss a lot on the International Risk Podcast, because it is a significant threat to so many countries, especially across Europe, and that's grey zone warfare. And when we talk about grey zone warfare, we're talking about this confrontation that is usually non-military. It's political, it's economic, it's informational, and it sometimes uses security tools to achieve a country's strategic aims while staying below the threshold of conventional military conflict. Now, key features of grey zone tactics usually include ambiguity. It's difficult to attribute who's responsible. There's the exploitation of what can be perceived to be legally grey areas. And it's very calibrated in the pressure that it applies. and it's serious enough to encourage change, but not enough to justify exploitation. But not enough to justify escalation. So I'm wondering how Morocco is employing grey zone theory to encourage there to be changes in the legal status of the enclaves. Have you seen any use of grey zone warfare by Morocco towards these two cities?

 

23:15: Ángeles Jiménez: So I think I can give a couple of examples. I mentioned the fences. We have the Spanish fence, and then there is the Moroccan fence. And there is a space between them. Who belongs to whom? We don't know. And all the incidents, the people who were killed in 2022 in Morocco when they were storming the fences, happened there. So it is Spanish territory, it is Moroccan territory, word it because it is between the two fences. So now we are in the normal land. We don't know. So I have read a lot about this, and I have colleagues supporting the idea that this happened in Spanish territory. It is outside our border, because when we built the borders, we just gave some space. But still, that is part of our initial territory around Théuta. So at the end of the day, we have militarized fences that create this sharp socioeconomic division with neighboring Moroccan regions. So the fence here means a lot. It's not only something physical that you can see and that we are not used to seeing today, because we travel in Europe and there are no fences, but there are no borders. So borders have disappeared in our minds. It's only when we travel to an airport that we have to identify ourselves if we are going outside the Schengen area. But here you can see a border, you can see and and you can see a militarized fence. So it is shocking what you are if it is the first time you are seeing this. And the second example would be the fact that, of course, Morocco has never recognized or the Moroccan state is not recognizing Spanish sovereignty over the enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla. When they acceded to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, they made a declaration that the fact that they are acceding to this convention doesn't mean at any point that they are recognizing Spanish sovereignty over these territories. But they have laws, and they have laws for the territorial sea, for the baselines in the Mediterranean, and they are using Ceuta and Melilla as base points. So it is not only that they are that that they are ignoring the maritime zones of Ceuta and Melilla, but it is also that they are adding fuel to the fire here because they are using Ceuta and Melilla as base points for their baseline. So it is diplomatically and politically, it is a sign, and then it is to Spain to protest to send a note verbal, or just to live with it. So we can see these kinds of things in our neighbouring relations. And as I said before, everything that happened in Spain at the end of the day will permeate the whole European Union, as we have recognised these two cities as part of the European Union.

 

25:50: Dominic Bowen: Yeah, I think that's really interesting. And I'd love to understand, do you see this as the sort of conflict or the sort of challenge that perhaps mirrors or is similarly represented in other territories around the world? Or is this a one-off?

 

26:03: Ángeles Jiménez: Honestly, this is quite tricky because here I think it's not an issue about sovereignty. The legal title of sovereignty seems to be clear here. So in the 60s, when the UN was calling for decolonization, and they were identifying the territories that were pending decolonization, Ceuta and Melilla were never there; they were never in that list. We have something, let's say, similar when we explain public international law to our students here. We say we live in Cádiz, and we have the two perfect case studies because we have Ceuta and Melilla, we have Ceuta just opposite, and we have Gibraltar around the corner. But Gibraltar, in its case, is part of this list of territories pending decolonization. It would be the same for Western Sahara. The situation was similar because Spain was the colonizer there, but that was a colony. So the consequences of a colony and the consequences of decolonization are different, having two cities, surrounded by… I think this is a unique situation, at least in the European-African relations. We might find maybe an example, I'm not sure about that, about French Guiana or the islands in the Caribbean. But when you are talking about an island, it is different. You don't really have a land border. There, we really have a border where you can see the fences, as I mentioned.

 

27:24: Dominic Bowen: So some of our listeners might be wondering, beautiful as the territories are, why doesn't Spain just avoid the conflict and give these countries or give these territories to Morocco? What would be the Spanish government's response to that?

 

27:36: Ángeles Jiménez: Our authorities are changing their political responses towards Morocco, especially since 2022, as they will change in position regarding Western Sahara. But regarding Ceuta and Melilla, I think it would be too much. We have to think that these are populated cities. There are over 80,000 residents in Ceuta, 85,000 in Melilla. These cities are multicultural. They are religiously diverse. Of course, the two main groups are Christians and Roman Catholics, and Muslims. But besides Christian and Muslim, there are small minorities. There are Jewish, historically Sephardic. There were Hindus because when India belonged to them was a colony of the UK, There were people from India, but on what today is Pakistan, moving to Gibraltar. There was this connection between the English colonies, and because of trade, they were moving on both sides of the Mediterranean. So there are there is a small Hindu community in Ceuta and Melilla. So that's why I said they have this kind of multi-character character, multiple identities. There are Spanish people there, Spanish people who were born there, and they have been there for centuries. It also has this European character, North African character, Amasig, which is the culture there that's what used to be called Berbers, they are called Amasig. Muslim, Christians, Jewish. So they are cities that are with economies that are shaped by this cross-border label. So I don't think it's crossed, I would say it has not crossed their mind yet to just avoid the conflict and leave Ceuta and Melilla, especially because of the title of sovereignty that is clear, and we have been there for over five centuries.

 

29:20: Dominic Bowen: Yeah, that's very interesting. Thanks for explaining that. Now, Spain has made submissions to the United Nations to extend the continental shelf beyond the standard 200 nautical miles that most countries recognise. Now, that means that there are now overlapping continental shelf claims between Morocco and Spain. especially around the southwest of the Canary Islands. And this is believed to hold some of the world's largest deposits of rare minerals, minerals that are vital for solar panels, for electric vehicles, and other emerging and modern technologies. So whichever country secures the legal recognition of this extended shelf really gains exclusive rights to explore and exploit these materials. And really, that creates substantial economic and strategic advantage. Now, Morocco has its own interpretations. But I wonder, from where you sit, from a maritime law, from a legal perspective, what do you advise and and how should business leaders be be watching these deep sea minerals, these... critical subsea cables and and what's the real significance of these shelf discussions, especially around access to things like rare earth energy resources and critical infrastructure corridors?

 

30:27: Ángeles Jiménez: So this topic is very close to my heart. I did my PhD on the extended continental shelf, studying the Spanish case. Spain has extended itself in the north with a joint submission with France, the UK, and Ireland that was approved years ago. We are done there. We are almost done in the Galicia area, in the west corner of the country, but the Canary Islands are pending. We made a submission in 2014 claiming our natural prolongation. And when we talk about standing on the continental shelf, it is about law, but it's also about geology. You need to demonstrate that there is a natural to direct prolongation from your continent or from your islands that continues under the sea. So this area, which is now at stake, this tropic, Mount Tropic, and that's where the rare earths are located, Spain has to prove, has to demonstrate to the UN, this is a procedure that goes beyond an entity of the UN, the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, we have to demonstrate and that these are this area is the natural prolongation of the Canary Islands. Morocco will try to do the same. So it is a natural prolongation of the Canary Islands, or it is a natural prolongation of the African continental shelf. The thing here is that Spain made its claim. This procedure takes a very long. We have been on the waiting list for years. We're expecting at least four or five more years before the CLCS starts considering our claim. But Morocco hasn't submitted the final claim. So we are playing this game blind because we know what we are asking for, but we don't know what our neighbors are asking for. And because they, in order to comply with the deadlines, have internal deadlines, according to UNCLOS, with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. So what they did was just submit some preliminary information. And with that, they complied with the deadline. But we haven't seen the final submission of Morocco. So we will see in the future, once they submit, how this is going. Are they claiming exactly the same zone? Now there are news these days, this these weeks because today there is a high level meeting between Spain and Morocco so of course for the last two weeks we have read a lot of news that Morocco is proposing a joint development area so we can enter into an agreement and we can but they are proposing something for this kind of agreement this kind of arrangement for something that is still not recognized as Spanish or Moroccan - I would say funny, but it's not that funny. In their submission, in their preliminary information, they don't include any map. So we don't know which kind from which coast they are claiming, but they have coordinates. And when you read the coordinates, we can see that they include the Western Sahara waters. So that will also be another element to consider because the overlap for the tropic months is not between Morocco and Spain, it is between Western Sahara and Spain. So four for the time being, there is no intermediary there. Situation might be changing and by the time the the Commission on the Limits opens our submission it might have changed but for the time being the overlap is not as i said canary island morocco it is western sahara canary islands so of course there is a lot of uh political interest there economic interest because of uh we don't have rich waters in terms of oil and gas but having rare minerals today it is the new trend it is what everyone wants. So, of course, there will be, I wouldn't say an open dispute for now. But let's see, in the coming years, once the CLCS starts considering our submission, what will happen with Morocco, and how they will react. because the danger of this procedure is that a non-verbal protest from a country can stop the procedure, can halt the procedure. And then it is not, so there is no distribution. There is no recognition of the extended continental shelf, and it can stay pending for decades, as has happened in many other areas of the world. So it is, tricky, and we have to be cautious, and we have to, I think this mutual distrust that characterizes our relations will be there, especially on this topic. But let's see what's happened today in this high-level meeting.

 

34:55: Dominic Bowen: Very interesting. Now we'll certainly see what happens there. Now, you've been a lecturer at the International Maritime Law Institute in Malta. You're obviously a lecturer today at the University of Cardiff. You're well-breathed in a variety of international law and threats and risks that we see around the world. So when you do look around the world, what are the international risks that concern you the most?

 

35:15: Ángeles Jiménez: So I was a lecturer at the IMO International Maritime Law Institute for five years. And the logic behind this kind of institute is not, of course, it is education, but it's more about capacity building. So it is for the countries, and this is one of the major risks, that is why I mentioned this, that the countries become parties to all kinds of conventions. They celebrate, they clap, and that's all. And then you need to incorporate. You need the implementation. It's not just that you are a party to the convention, and you are happy because of that. The fact that you are a party to a convention means that you have obligations and rights. But having obligations means that you need to implement. Internally, you have to adapt your legal system to be able to comply with the new obligations that you have voluntarily agreed to implement.

 

42:36.82: Ángeles Jiménez: To adopt so that would be this issue of implementation, all countries being able to adapt their legal systems to the international obligations is one of the risks, because in the case this is not done, the system won't work. And the system if the system doesn't work in the law of the sea, it means that nothing will work. Water is covering 70% of our of the earth, of earth. So of course, navigation, traffic, trade, all this is related to the law of the sea. We might think about the law of the sea only in terms of maritime zones, I have my territorial sea and I can navigate or fish, but it's not only about that. It is the exploitation of resources, which will again be one of the big topics, the hot potatoes for the future. the development in the international cibet area who can exploit the “who can do deep cibet mining who is entitled who can get a license how this is uh governed there is indeed an authority the international cibet authority but this is still and under development so this is one of the main issues that are coming and they will be i think in the next 10 years uh we will see a real change in Because with the progression in technology, one day we will be able to exploit those civets. We are not floating today because of technology. When we are talking about four or 5,000 meters of depth, it is impossible today. But what is impossible today will be possible tomorrow. So deep civet mining. Then we have a new agreement that will enter into force next month, January 2026, the BVNJ agreement, the biodiversity vision national jurisdiction. Again, one of the hot topics today, states are ratifying, it has attracted enough ratification, so it will enter into force, but now it is time to work. So once it enters into force, we need to see which kind of protected areas we need to create. We need to see how we are going to implement the environmental impact assessment. So it is time the obligations come into play. And so many topics are open in the law of the sea. There are related topics that are again there, like migration by sea, traffic of narcotics. We see what is happening these days in the Caribbean, in Venezuela. At the end of the day, everything is related. And when we talk about the law of the sea, even if we try to create small pieces, one piece is connected to the other one. So the fact that if we understand, if a state fully understands what the rights and obligations in each maritime zone, which is its jurisdiction, what we can do here, what we can't do here, that will facilitate the way the state can play its games in the sea.

 

38:42: Dominic Bowen: Very interesting. Thank you for raising all those topics. And there are certainly some interesting ones there. And of course, we've seen a lot in the last couple of weeks, the Secretary of the Department of War, Pete Hegseth, trying to defend what is potentially a breach of the law of the sea. And of course, the laws of armed conflict when targeting what is termed a narco-terrorist. But certainly a lot of things to unpack there. And thank you very much for coming on the International Risk Podcast today.

 

39:04: Ángeles Jiménez: Thank you very, very much. It has been really a pleasure to discuss a bit a bit a bit about this, one of the most geopolitically sensitive areas. And at the same time, they are unknown. When I tell people we take our students to Ceuta and Melilla, it's like, “where are you taking them?” They are not really aware of the systems of these two cities. So if this helps to put them on a map, and then raises curiosity and people to go and check more about these two cities. And of course, why not plan a trip there? As I said, it's not that it is the easiest thing, but if you come here, you can take a ferry. If you go to Madrid, you can take a flight to Melilla too.

 

39:41: Dominic Bowen: and they certainly look like very beautiful enclaves and sitting in the depth of a European winter right now, going to a location like the two cities of Ceuta or Melilla sounds absolutely beautiful. But thanks very much for coming on the podcast today.

39:53: Ángeles Jiménez: Thank you very much. It has been a pleasure.

39:55: Dominic: Well, that was a great conversation with Angeles Jimenez. She's an expert on the law of the sea, on maritime boundary delimitations, and other international laws. I really appreciated hearing her insights today on grey zones, on migration risks, over sovereignty disputes, over Ceuta and Melilla. And I think these are important case studies that really inform us about a lot of other topics at the same time.

Please remember to go to the International Risk Podcast website and subscribe to our email list to get our email in your inbox every two weeks to get all our latest news, articles, and podcasts. Today's podcast was produced and coordinated by Melanie Meimoun and our multimedia is edited by Stephen Penny. I'm Dominic Bowen, your host. Thanks very much for listening, and we'll speak again in the next couple of days.

40:38: Elisa Garbil: Thank you for listening to this episode of the International Risk Podcast. For more episodes and articles, visit theinternationalriskpodcast.com, follow us on LinkedIn, Bluesky, and Instagram for the latest updates, and ask your questions to our host, Dominic Bowen. See you next time!