The International Risk Podcast

Episode 281: Protests and Public Dissident in Serbia with Vjosa Musliu

Dominic Bowen Season 5 Episode 281

In this episode, Dominic Bowen hosts Vjosa Musliu to analyse the growing wave of protests and dissent across Serbia. Together, they examine the EU’s influence, the controversial lithium extraction agreement, and the role of media bias in shaping public opinion. From political repression to Serbia–Kosovo tensions, they trace how civil rights and democracy are being tested in one of Europe’s most complex regions.

Vjosa Musliu is an Associate Professor of International Relations at the VUB. Her research interests include international and European interventions, conflicts and international political economy. Her area of focus is primarily the Balkans and post-Soviet space. She is a co-editor of the Routledge Series of Studies in Intervention and Statebuilding and co-founder of Yugoslawomen+ Collective, a collective of six academics from the post-Yugoslav space working in ‘Global North’ academia She is also a board director at the Youth Initiative for Human Rights Kosovo. She is the author of three books and dozens of journal articles in the field of international relations. Before entering academia, she worked as a journalist in Kosovo. Vjosa is based between Belgium and Kosovo.

The International Risk Podcast brings you conversations with global experts, frontline practitioners, and senior decision-makers who are shaping how we understand and respond to international risk. From geopolitical volatility and organised crime, to cybersecurity threats and hybrid warfare, each episode explores the forces transforming our world and what smart leaders must do to navigate them. Whether you’re a board member, policymaker, or risk professional, The International Risk Podcast delivers actionable insights, sharp analysis, and real-world stories that matter.

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Vjosa Musliu: there have been, multiple cases in which we have seen, not only Serbia engaging in, the recognition, campaigns, against Kosso. That means convincing specific, sovereign states to revert their, recognition for Kosovo. Even though the recognition as such does not have a weight under international law.

Elisa Garbil: Welcome back to the International Risk Podcast, where we discuss the latest world news and significant events that impact businesses and organizations worldwide.

Dominic Bowen: Hi. Welcome to the International Risk Podcast, where we unpack the topics that matter. I'm Dominic Bowen, your host, and today we're discussing Serbia at a crossroads elections that have been flagged for serious irregularities, pressure from Brussels over Russian sanctions and persistent flashpoints with Kosovo To unpack the risk landscape, I'm joined by associate Professor Vjosa Musliu. She's an expert on European interventions and on the Balkans. Professor Vjosa, welcome to the International Risk Podcast. 

Vjosa Musliu: [00:01:00] Thank you for having me. It's a great pleasure to be here, Dominic. 

Dominic Bowen: Now the current leader in Serbia ic, he's is increasingly consolidated power.

He's been employing tactics, typical of authoritarians. He's been repressing protests, controlling the media, using state resources to influence elections, deploying rhetoric that frames dissent as foreign interference even when it's not. And under his rule, political opposition has faced harassment. public supporters of protests have suffered disciplinary measures.

Police units have have spread fear in in many, many communities. Now, despite early appearances as a pro-European reformist, he's really shifted towards closer alliances with Russia and China over the last few years and adopted this really strong nationalistic and anti-Western rhetoric. Now this trajectory has sparked widespread protests with many observers, noting a path similar to previous authoritarian regimes in the region.

Can you describe how you see it from where you are today in Brussels and from the people you are speaking with? What's happening on the streets of Belgrade today? 

Vjosa Musliu: well. In [00:02:00] addition to the, to the stories that we have seen and have been able to, follow via the media, Serbia has been enveloped via wave of protests, since last year, since November, last year.

And they started following the death of 16 people after the collapse of. Concrete, canopy in, the renovated noad train station. And then since then, this became like an entry point for massive protest demonstrations. And, student, blockades that, sparked in Belgrade, sparked in in noad, and then reached out to other, other cities.

And granted. Then these protests grew up, in time and, and involved many sectorial, groups and many more people. However, it would be shortsighted to think of these protests simply as a reflection of, of the death of the tragic death of, 16 people after the collapse of that, concrete canopy in Noad.

I think, what, what has happened and what the protests have shown is a reaction, [00:03:00] to a longer accumulated anger. To a longer accumulated, dissatisfaction and descent with an increasingly authoritarian. grip from, the party and from the, ruling elite with, Alexander ic, at its head.

So for those who have followed, the Balam politics a bit more closely, or even, Serbian inner, developments, closely, we do see that, this is also not, not a recent development. It has been more than a decade now, where we witness how the ruling party, the Serbian progressive party, steadily and, progressively eroded political rights and, and civil liberties, independent media, as well as, civil and artistic organizations.

What we see now. Also, the response of the regime. Towards the protestors, is a continuation of a much longer line of a repression of political opposition, civil society, descent, as well as intellectual and, [00:04:00] academic, descent voiced against the regime in Belgrade. 

Dominic Bowen: And the organization for security and cooperation in Europe.

The OSCE produced their final report on the December, 2023 elections, and they cited the misuse of public resources, media bias and pressure on voters. Now, this is a real drag that bleeds into politics and policy predictability, and I think it's quite concerning for both Serbians, but also people right across Europe that care about Serbia.

If we look two years on since the 2023 elections, how close do you think Serbia is to a tipping point between either reforms driven by the protestors or a consolidation of ICS authoritarian rule? 

Vjosa Musliu: . So I think we cannot talk about, Serbia in a vacuum without, taking into consideration the, incredible role, and the intervening role that the EU has with countries that are in, in the accession process, including, uh, Serbia in, in this case.

So following the elections, of [00:05:00] 2023, The events that, followed after that, I think it would be, important to contextualize those in a couple of decisions that were initiated by specific member states of the European Union, but also the European Commission itself. So here I'm, I'm primarily referring To the lithium extraction agreement that was signed, from, Ola Schultz and, the heads of the Serbian government. And then, also, that spilled over in a successive, rounds of meetings and other agreements, uh, signed, which would enable, essentially enable the European, union to extract Serbia's lithium resources in the other region in north, Western, Serbia.

And what this does for the European Union and why is it important Is that it, it allows the European Union to, make that, green transition. And as we know, the relations between China and the EU has been, largely, A contested one, has been, at times a conflictual one since the pandemic, onwards. So the U has been actively seeking for opportunities to [00:06:00] decrease its reliance, when it comes to, Raw materials and critical raw materials from actors such as Russia, as well as China and the lithium reserves in Serbia provided this, important venue where the EU could both buy its green transition and at the same time. Decreased reliance on lithium from, China at this, historical point.

And I think a lot of the problems, if we go back now to the election results, so the continuous, authoritarian grip from, the government led by Alexander Vu, which has been, repeatedly referred to. As problematic as partially free in many reports from the Freedom House Human Rights Watch among others.

these discussions about the ever deteriorating, rule of law inside Serbia and democratic practices inside Serbia has been, Rather swept under the carpet, in the ice of Brussels because, to put it, simply there have been bigger fish to fry. And the green transition is a major, turning point for the European Union.

We're talking about a union that [00:07:00] has been facing multiple crisis since the financial crisis of 2008. the sanctions against Russia, the war in Ukraine, the genocidal war in Gaza, as well. Followed with, an increased migration crisis. All of these have created this volatile. Political and extremely polarized, sphere inside the eu.

So the usage, or let's say the reliance on the green transition has become a bit of a bigger project than perhaps what was initially, Thought of from eu, leaders, many scholars, for instance, that I regularly talk to. When, when we discuss this at conferences, many scholars have talked about the green transition as, having the potential to become this new myth.

For the European, union, like normative power used to be in the nineties and the early two thousands, we see now a continuous hint towards that. That also means that certain parts of the world, such as the Western Balkans, such as Serbia. That are parts of eus [00:08:00] Governmentality, will have to undergo through a number of processes such as Serbia is undergoing now.

but that's, even in cases where some of these processes will be, very problematic in terms of erosion of, political, rights that will not necessarily, be signaled properly in. Brussels primarily because of these geopolitical, stalemate and conditions in which the European Union finds, uh, finds itself.

Dominic Bowen: Mm. Now that's a really interesting narrative. I think perhaps one that, that many Serbians and I think people that are really advocates of, the rule of law and, and democracy might find a little bit hard to stomach, but, um, much, much, much appreciated. And I wonder when you, when you look at the, the regime, the, the protests really are testing the regime's capacity to absorb this descent.

But, The regime and the, the, the government in Serbia is maintaining control through the media. They're maintaining this narrative distortion at times and this selective repression of, of elements of the community. how long can the, the regime tolerate this? Or, or do you see it as, [00:09:00] quite robust and, and nothing that the protesters are going to be able to influence?

Vjosa Musliu: there is a part of this story is what happens with these protests inside Serbia proper, and then there is another story of what the regime can make with and via these protests in light of Serbia's geopolitical position at this, At this point, I have to perhaps first stop at the protest to also, explain the multiplicity of agendas of groups.

That have been proliferating in the protest since, November, 2024. And here it is important to point out that, massive, and perhaps, overwhelming as the protests, were as it was expected. in time we see that there has been, a cacophony. Of agendas, a cacophony of slogans in inside the protest.

And, uh, unfortunately, yet again as it was to be expected, and I'll explain this hopefully, in a moment, we also saw, um, a. Sectorial groups within the protests, either, propagating and [00:10:00] foregrounding pro-Russia messages, or the, old age anti Albanian, bigotry that has been actually very, widely featured in many of the protests that we have seen thus far.

Now this grouping and this multiplicity of voices and agendas within protest at the same time also weakens. the overall message and the overall dissent that is being, directed towards, towards the government because that means that, if we have all of these sometimes diametrically opposite, messages, it is also a bit difficult.

To Garner regional support, for the protests. And that's why it does not surprise me that there has been the protests in Serbia proper have been widely criticized, in Kosovo, in Bosnia, segoa among others, precisely because of this very insular, 

The inability of, the, of the protests to actually. Hold the Serbian regime accountable, not only for the erasure of Democratic and political freedoms, but also for the continuous obstructionist stance that it [00:11:00] maintains, especially towards Kosovo, but then also the meddling in Montenegro, in Bosnia, segoa among others.

Dominic Bowen: Yeah, that, I think that was really helpful to, to unpack and, you know, when we look at the press Freedom index, you know, Serbia ranks 96 out of 180 states, which is not obviously a great ranking. And media capture and economic pressure complicate due diligence and, and early warning signals.

But, but I wonder how should firms, how should diplomats, how should political advisors be triangulating the truth in Serbia? What sources? Academic networks, civil society channels, how do you vet those when, when mainstream narratives are, are distorted and maybe not entirely trustworthy? And how do you go through the news?

How do you identify what's truth, faction and, and spin? 

Vjosa Musliu: Well, that's, that's a difficult, conversation, and a difficult exercise to make on a daily basis with the algorithmic based, media. in addition. And the Serbia is certainly not the only, not the only case. Um. grapples with this kind of, of problem.

This is a wider [00:12:00] issue. Serbia notwithstanding, I think in addition to the data from the Press Freedom Index and other types of indexes, that you also, pointed at. Serbia has had, traditionally a problematic, press when it comes to, especially towards, narratives of, of its neighbors, but also in relation to us.

Several policies and, and, and politics that have been, coming in the direction of Serbia, either from, from Brussels or from, from Washington. so even before, 2023, it was, it was common to see, people like, Radovan, Kaji, writing, opinion pieces in Serbia's, daily, newspapers.

Inflammatory language, extremely polarizing language, anti anti Albanian bigotry, other types of languages that would, perpetuate, inter-ethnic animosities. These used to be, unfortunately, very much part of the, of the Serbian media, landscape. So in that sense. Even without the algorithm and without the problems that new technologies have brought to the [00:13:00] media, I think, we have had issues before identifying, especially the tabloid press, and, and counteracting those, uh, those types of narratives.

What we see is happening now is that many of those narratives and many of those, tabloids are actively being used and perpetuated from, the regime itself. To, either, delegitimize the protestors to intimidate, protesters and to, again, perhaps depoliticize also inadvertently some of the, some of the very political claims that, that there are made, in addition to the, to the media landscape.

I think something that gets, uh, a lot of the times, goes under the radar actually, is that there is this wider atmosphere of, intimidation. For instance, just let me give you a couple of examples that we, together with the Yugoslav Women Plus collective, a collective with which I worked together with, have been writing about, when it comes to the.

Erosion of civil and political rights, in Serbia. For instance, in July, 2024, we had the cancellation of this, longstanding [00:14:00] festival, which was called Bertan, which in, in Albanian is, good afternoon. And so it's, Bertan in Serbian. Which was, a festival banned by the minister, by the Serbian minister of, of interior.

Now the festival aimed to bring together artists and human rights activists from both ends, both from Kosovo and Serbia to foster peace and, And corporation now hand in hand with the banning of the festival. There was also this hate campaign launched against the festival organizers in Belgrade, reaching dangerously low and gruesome levels, by sending a decimated head of a pig in box with a hateful message to the Director of Youth Initiative for human rights, in Serbia, for instance. Only last week we had the prohibition of Rao, who is a Swiss, playwright and theater producer.

from the Belgrade, theater Festival because, Rao had, maintained some very, critical stances against, Serbia's, lithium extraction agreement signed, with the eu. So. In addition to the media, we, the media or the, [00:15:00] disinformation from the media is only one of the many facets where one could trace, the, erosion of political, freedoms and the freedom of speech, the cultural scene and Serbia is also, rampant with examples, such as these, and there are unfortunately.

Many more, in addition to the cancellation of Bertan Festival or, the more recent discussions with, Belgrade Theater festival.

Dominic Bowen: And I'll, and I'll take the opportunity to remind our listeners that you can find our podcast on YouTube now. So if you prefer to watch your podcast, then search for the International W Podcast on YouTube today. Please remember to hit subscribe and like, this is really critical for our success.

Tensions today between Serbia and Kosovo are tens. now they're centered on issues of territorial control, ethnic divisions, sovereignty claims. And this is especially true in in Northern Kosovo where there's a significant se minority. Now, the Kosovo government has taken steps to centralized power to assert authority [00:16:00] over the northern municipalities.

Serbia has responded with threats regarding possible military deployments. Now, there has been clashes involving armed groups and the Kosovo Police, in the past, including a real noticeable incident in 2023 when there was a Serbian trained paramilitary group that smuggled heavy weapons into Kosovo.

And this resulted in some deaths now. Serbia continues to support the Kosovo SE population politically and militarily. While Kosovo insists on enforcing its sovereignty over its independent Albanian majority state. When you look at the situation in Kosovo and the relationship between Serbia and Kosovo, how concerned are you about the risk of, of conflict between these two states?

Vjosa Musliu: Yeah, animosity has increased, and, all those, traces or patterns of reconciliation that perhaps used to be there, more than 10 years ago are simply not, there now.

And this should not come as a surprise to anyone, who lives in the region and especially for those who live inside Kosovo and Serbia. because, Serbia has been, [00:17:00] on, rerecognition, campaign against Kosovo ever VO declared its independence from Serbia in 2008. a move, of independence that was recognized by.

All of the Western allies, and up to 120, states, today. But it's a move of independence that was, swiftly opposed and strongly opposed by Serbia, Russia, and, and their allies. despite processes with the EU facilitated the dialogue between Cosmo and Serbia from 20, 12, from 2013 onwards.

What we do see on the ground is that, the animosities at the governmental level have only deteriorated or increased contrary to the, uh, to the spirit of the negotiations, contrary to the spirit of the dialogue that is facilitated by the eu and it's still in one way or another, still part of the agenda.

there have been, multiple cases in which we have seen, not only Serbia engaging in, the recognition, campaigns, against Kosso. That means convincing [00:18:00] specific, sovereign states to revert their, recognition for Kosovo. Even though the recognition as such does not have a weight under international law.

As my colleagues m has elaborated widely in his book. And at the same time, as you also rightly mentioned, with actively provoking, violence, especially in Northern Kosovo where the, power and influence of the Serbian government is a bit more pronouns than in other parts of Kosovo. This has also, As it is to be expected, perhaps has maintained the securitization discourse in Kosovo, of Serbia as an imminent threat. Very much present. And this has also fueled, a rhetoric from successive governments in Kosovo, of the necessity to be protected, of the necessity, to be on guard. And it has also then, increased.

Distrust and animosity between Thess and the Albanians, inside, Kosovo as well. Whether there will be, a potential for, conflict escalation. or not. I think that will have to be a discussion in which we [00:19:00] would then also have to think about , the legal infrastructure in which, NATO operates in Kosovo because, anytime Serbia decides or thinks about, Making a military presence or a military attack in Kosovo, this has to be contextualized in the legal contours in which NATO operates, in Kosovo as well. So it's to simplify it a little bit, it would also be taken an attack against nato, and I think that is not necessarily a viable option, however.

Conflict in and of itself, should not merely be understood as, um. As an armed friction between, between two groups. This can be an invariable, attack or, the maintenance of a frozen conflict that can be instrumentalized. whenever certain regimes or political elites in Belgrade, uh, need, To, let's say, to keep, or to change discourse inside, Serbia and to divert the opinion of the Serbian public, from what is happening inside to the perennial issue of having at Lost Kosovo.

Dominic Bowen: Yeah, I [00:20:00] think , that's a great distinction actually, and I think that would probably be really interesting. You've obviously, written three books, dozens of journal articles in, in the field of international relations. When you look around the world, what are the international risks that concern you the most?

Vjosa Musliu: well, I, I think on this, I have quite a brussel centered view in the sense that, the problems that are more perceived as acute, in the European Union are probably the ones that I am, grappling with the most. , what is particularly, worrying or problematic, I think, has to do With the very volatile, International order, that we have, been living under. many have called this a transactional, based world order where you have, sometimes very banal exchange, between, economic agreements in exchange for, for a peace process or for a peace agreement. This happened, for instance, under, president Trump's, negotiations with, with Ukraine.

If I were to look from eus perspective in relation to the Western Balkans, which is my area of expertise, I [00:21:00] think the face eus, external relations with the Balkans, but also the face of Europeanization or the EU integration with the Western Balkans has, had a dramatic shift, at least, in the discourse of level, right?

So, Whereas in two thousands and after, in, the decade of, 2010, perhaps the EU was adamant about, It's normative commitment and about, reform of rule of law, political freedoms, sustainable institutions, good governance in the countries of, uh, of the Balkans, because of these global shifts and changes.

So on unpredictable us, administration on the one hand, and also, an ever more assertive, uh, China in the eyes of the, of the eu. Have also turned the EU into a more, transaction, based actor. And I'll, I'll try to elaborate this, very briefly. So in addition to eus lithium, agreements signed, uh, with Serbia, which both from bioengineers [00:22:00] but also environmental scientists and political activists is seen as.

having potential, detrimental impacts both for political freedoms, but also for the environmental impact at the same time you have, a, a couple of years ago, a controversial agreement signed between the government of Denmark and the government of Kosovo about renting a number of, prisons in Kosovo whereby, Foreign inmates who are being kept in Denmark would actually be shipped, to, serve their, prison term in Kosovo prisons. Now, this is not your typical prison exchange agreement whereby, you know, countries decide to do this. on both ends, this is, New form of welfare nationalism or panel nationalism whereby specific migrants from Denmark will have to be shipped to Kosovo to serve their, their time there.

And this is also being negotiated, continent on, Kosovo using, 200 million, euros of Of a grant from Denmark on Kosovo's green transition as well. So it is very [00:23:00] problematic, the intersection that is being drawn. For instance, between the green transition and a number of. Potential problems that will arise once this agreement starts to take shape.

and the third, perhaps, item that I would want to, to mention on this, on this changing landscape of eus engagement with the Western Balkans has to do with, ongoing, Italy, Albania, migrants. protocol migration protocol whereby you have two detention centers built by, two Italian facilities built on Albanian soil.

And then, um. Asylum seekers who are reaching Italian shores will, instead of waiting for their asylum to be processed in Italy, they will be sent to Albania and wait for that, process to be taken by Italian authorities while they wait In Albania, what do these things have in common? For instance, the lithium deal.

The, the prison inmates, from Denmark to Kosovo and, the detention Centers of Italy in Albania Secure. You create this kind of a situation where countries of the Western Balkans, Serbia, Kosovo, and [00:24:00] Albania, and in this case are rendered into a type of, for lack of a better word, into a dumping ground for, European environmental and human waste, or what the European Union, considers as environmental and, human, human waste.

All of these agreements are at the same time negotiated at the backdrop of. Bringing faster and, in a more comprehensive way, countries such as Kosovo, Serbia, and Albania to the European Union. And if we are negotiating processes of Europeanization and EU integration through these, processes of dehumanization of others or environmental, potentials for environmental degradation, then I think we're also renegotiating the very core of what EU integration will look like.

WR large, the Western Balkan countries are not withstanding. and even though this is not very much part of the public discourse or the media discourse in Brussels, I think what is, what has been happening over the past five years in use engagement with the countries of the Western Balkans is a, a very good, an [00:25:00] unfortunate indication of this changing face and changing landscape in how the EU conducts and maintains its relations with its others. 

Dominic Bowen: Well, thanks very much for that, and thanks very much for drawing that red thread between those, uh, seemingly unrelated topics, but, but clearly are very related, that, that's really great insight.

So thank you very much and thank you very much for coming on the International Risk Podcast, Fiosa. 

Vjosa Musliu: Thank you very much for having me, Dominic. It was a pleasure. 

Dominic Bowen: Well, that was a great conversation with Vjosa Musliu is an associate professor of international relations, and I really appreciated hearing her thoughts on the current situation in Serbia.

Its relationships with the EU and with other states around the world. Please go to wherever you download your podcast and subscribe to ensure you get all our podcasts in your feed. And remember to go to the International Risk Podcast website to subscribe to our email newsletter. Today's podcast was produced.

And coordinated by Elisa Garbil. I'm Dominic Bowen, your host. Thanks very much for listening. We'll speak again in the next couple of days.

Elisa Garbil: Thank you for listening to this episode of the International Risk [00:26:00] Podcast. For more episodes and articles, visit the international risk podcast.com. Follow us on LinkedIn, blue Sky, and Instagram for the latest updates, and to ask your questions to our host, Dominic Bowen. See you next time.